Rather than examining firm-level data on capital structure and asset structure, we connect the financing choice to the characteristics of specific investments. We hand-collect and classify those characteristics. Controlling for a firm's existing assets, capital structure and valuation, we document a strong link between an investment's characteristics and the type of security issued if the investment is externally financed. Investments with more volatile and distant payoffs tend to be equity-financed. Investments in assets that are both tangible and non-unique tend to be debt-financed. The likelihood of debt financing increases with the need for monitoring and convertibles are relatively more common when payoffs are volatile and investment life is uncertain. Factor analysis indicates that the principal dimension determining the form of financing is the R&D-like nature of an investment. JEL classification: E22, G32
Introduction
This paper investigates the impact of investment characteristics on the debt-equity choice.
Trade-off theory recognizes that the optimal balance between debt's financial distress costs and tax advantages depends on an investment's risk characteristics and the time until taxable income is produced. The superior information enjoyed by management in the pecking order theory (Myers, 1984) and market timing theory (Baker and Wurgler, 2002) can also be impacted by the characteristics of a firm's investments. Further, agency costs can be impacted by investment characteristics (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . We rationalize and document a strong empirical link between the characteristics of investments and firms' choices between issuing debt or equity to raise the necessary finance. Rather than examining firm-level data on capital structure and asset structure, we connect the financing choice to the characteristics of specific investments. We hand-collect and classify those characteristics.
1 Since recapitalizing a firm is costly, past performance can mean capital structure will deviate from the optimum and the observed cross-sectional relation between asset characteristics and leverage will then be a noisy variant of the optimal relation (Strebulaev, 2007) . Our examination of the financing of new investments focuses on the situation when the relevant transaction cost of issuing securities is only the marginal cost of issuing debt versus equity; i.e., on the situation when managers can largely focus on future restructuring costs, agency costs, taxes, information asymmetries, and security mispricing issues. We examine all instances of seasoned equity, straight debt and convertible issues by U.S. firms between 1995 and 2014 where the stated use of proceeds is capital expenditure and we can determine the characteristics of the investment.
The set of investment characteristics that we investigate are as follows: whether the investment is both tangible and non-unique; whether the investment is part of an R&D program; the investment's expected life; the uncertainty surrounding that life; the time until the investment will begin to generate positive payoffs; the volatility of the payoffs; and the need for monitoring. Controlling for a firm's existing assets, capital structure, and valuation, we document that five of these seven characteristics are statistically significant determinants of the financing choice. Investments with more volatile payoffs and investments in R&D-like 1 Other studies that focus on the financing of new investments do not examine their characteristics. Dudley (2012) examines Compustat firm-years in which investments exceed 1.5 times the median industry rate while Elsas, Flannery and Garfinkel (2015) examines Compustat firm-years in which investments exceed 30% of assets. These papers link the debt-equity choice to the difference between firms' existing and target capital structures, a measure that we incorporate as a control.
3 programs are more likely to be financed by issuing equity. In contrast, investments in tangible non-unique assets, or in assets with more uncertain lives, or in assets that require a high level of monitoring are more likely to be financed by issuing debt. Consistent with a benefit from a future ability to force conversion during a staged investment program, we find that callable convertibles tend to be used to finance high volatility investments with uncertain lives.
The seven investment characteristics are correlated and their separate effects are not immediately clear-consider investment life versus the time until positive payoffs. We therefore use factor analysis to investigate a smaller set of common factors underlying the characteristics. Investment characteristics vary primarily along a dimension that is consistent with the R&D-like nature of the investment, while the second (third) most important factor relates to the tangible and non-unique nature of an investment coupled with long life (the tangible and non-unique nature of an investment coupled with low payoff volatility). A regression of the debt-equity choice on these three factors indicates that the R&D-like nature of an investment is positively related to the probability of an equity issue, while investments that load heavily on the tangible, non-unique characteristics coupled with either long-term payoffs or non-volatile payoffs are more likely to be debt-financed.
Our analysis is innovative by connecting specific financing choices to specific investment characteristics and our main contribution is to improve our understanding of how investment characteristics impact financing decisions. Our study also contributes to the literature on collateral value as a determinant of the financing choice. Titman and Wessels (1988) observes that tangibility is only a partial measure of whether an asset has collateral value. An investment has collateral value only to the extent it is both tangible and redeployable. Tangible assets can be offered for sale. But only if the asset is non-unique and therefore redeployable will there be any demand from buyers. Determining the uniqueness of the set of assets owned by a firm using Compustat firm-level data requires using crude proxies for uniqueness such as expenditures on research and development, marketing expenses, and the rate at which employees voluntarily leave their jobs. In contrast, we estimate the uniqueness of specific investments be examining the breadth of the resale market for the particular investment. We show that it is the non-unique character of a tangible asset that is an important driver of the debt-equity financing choice and not its tangibility per se.
Our study has potential limitations. Naturally, a sample of externally-financed investments necessarily conditions on the fact that the firm was either unwilling or unable to finance via 4 retained earnings. 2 Also, our determination of the characteristics of investments involves some subjectivity. Another limitation is that our sample investigates only those investments for which we can obtain information on the characteristics of the investments. Still, we succeed in examining every public seasoned-equity, convertible, and straight debt issue used by nonutility and non-financial U.S. firms between 1995 and 2014 where the stated use of proceeds is capital expenditures and where either issuer announcements or press stories contain sufficient information to determine the investments' characteristics. A further potential limitation is that issuer announcements and press stories may be more likely to contain information sufficient to determine the investment's characteristics when the investment is equity-financed. We use a sample selection model to control for this last possibility.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical link between investment characteristics and the debt-equity choice. Section 2 also develops predictions on the signs of the coefficients of a logistic regression of the financing choice on both the set of investment characteristics and a set of controls suggested by the extant capital structure literature. Section 3 describes the classification of investment characteristics. Section 4 reports the initial logistic regression results of the relation between financing and characteristics.
Section 5 shows that the results are similar when a Heckman two-stage sample selection procedure is employed. Section 6 investigates the common factors underlying investment characteristics and the link between these factors and the debt-equity choice. Section 7 focuses on convertible bond financing and the characteristics of investments financed by issuing a convertible rather than either equity or straight debt. Section 8 concludes.
Investment characteristics and the financing choice
Trade-off theory predicts that when a firm's existing capital structure deviates from its optimum, that deviation will impact the financing of a new investment. And since the pecking order and market timing explanations of the financing choice will also play a role in how a new investment is financed, our empirical analysis controls for determinants of the financing choice beyond the investment's characteristics.
Investment characteristics: Theory
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Investment characteristics that potentially affect the financing choice are the investment's collateral value; whether the investment is part of a sequential program; the expectation of the investment's life; the uncertainty surrounding that life; the volatility of the investment's payoffs; the time until the investment begins to produce income; and the degree of monitoring required.
Collateral value
While traditional trade-off theory predicts a positive link between collateral value and debt financing, Haugen and Senbet (1978) observes that if costs similar to those associated with bankruptcy (e.g., liquidation costs) would have been incurred by an all-equity financed firm that experienced similarly poor operating performance, then the marginal bankruptcy cost associated with debt financing would be zero and collateral value will be unrelated to the choice between debt and equity. The event of bankruptcy and the decision to bear the costs of liquidation would be correlated, but debt-financing would not be the cause of the incurrence of liquidation costs. Thus the trade-off theory notion of a trade-off between financial distress costs associated with debt financing and tax benefits of debt financing must implicitly assume that stockholder-bondholder coordination costs mean that levered and unlevered firms differ in their restructuring decisions (Titman, 1984) . White (1989) shows that coordination costs in conjunction with the U.S. bankruptcy code can lead levered firms to continue loss-making operations when an otherwise equivalent all-equity financed firm would liquidate or otherwise restructure. 3 When assets have high collateral value more secured debt can be issued without risking bankruptcy and the need for coordination. Stockholder-bondholder coordination problems are thereby reduced and higher levels of tax-deductible debt will be optimal.
There are also information asymmetry-based reasons why assets with high collateral value are more likely to be financed with debt. White (1989) observes that secured loans have the advantage that secured lenders need only monitor the assets subject to the lien and not the firm's overall financial condition. Myers and Majluf (1984) establishes that in the presence of an information asymmetry it can be optimal to finance high collateral value investments with 6 debt. A high collateral value means a high lower bound on the investment's future value and in turn a high minimum value for debt claims on the investment.
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In summary, both trade-off theory and information asymmetries support our first prediction:
Prediction 1. High collateral value investments are less likely to be equity-financed.
Sequential investment programs
Trade-off theory and agency theory both predict that sequential investments like R&D programs will more likely to be equity-financed. 5 One reason is that R&D has little collateral value and hence the likelihood of a suboptimal restructuring decision will be higher if the project is debt-financed. Further, Myers (1977) 
Uncertainty concerning an investment's life
If an investment is to be debt-financed, then maturity matching will reduce both refinancing costs and agency-related debt overhang problems (Myers, 1977; Barclay and Smith, 1995; Stohs and Mauer, 1996) . The fact that matching is more difficult when the investment's life is uncertain, underlies our next prediction:
Prediction 4. Investments with highly uncertain lives are more likely to be equity-financed.
Payoff volatility
Trade-off theory predicts that investments with highly volatile payoffs are more likely to be financed with equity. This is because high volatility will mean a higher chance of a future stockholder-bondholder coordination problem and a suboptimal restructuring.
Prediction 5. High volatility investments are more likely to be equity-financed.
The time until an investment begins to produce payoffs
A firm that borrows must either hold low return liquid assets or incur transactions costs of additional borrowing to cover any interest payments that fall due before the investment begins to produce positive payoffs. Further, the corporate tax saving associated with interest deductions cannot be enjoyed until the investment produces taxable income (Berens and Cuny, 1995) . Both observations underlie Prediction 6.
Prediction 6. The longer the time until an investment produces payoffs, the more likely the investment will be equity-financed.
The need for monitoring
Monitoring can potentially be undertaken by an incentivized manager irrespective of how an investment is financed (Dybvig and Zender, 1991) . But the financing choice will act in conjunction with management incentives when outsiders are skilled at monitoring management's operation of an investment. For example, financing via a series of short-term debt issues can enhance monitoring by forcing the periodic reevaluation of a project. Further, financing an investment that has collateral value by issuing long-term secured debt will link the effective maturity and priority of the loan to how informed the lender chooses to be (Rajan and Winton, 1995) . Monitoring can also be facilitated by placing equity with a blockholder (Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi, 1997; Edmans, 2014) , but since over 99 percent of the equity issues in our sample are public issues, we have Prediction 7.
Prediction 7. The greater the need for monitoring, the less likely an investment will be equityfinanced.
Logistic Regression
We investigate Predictions 1 through 7 using a logistic regression of the relative likelihood that an investment will be financed by equity rather than straight debt with the independent variables being measures of investment characteristics and a set of controls.  will be negative.
Logistic regression controls
Controls related to trade-off theory
A firm's existing capital structure and the characteristics of its existing assets will influence how a new investment is financed. As an example, consider a firm that has performed well since its capital structure was last re-optimized. The firm may have become under-levered and regardless of a new investment's characteristics the firm will have an incentive to finance with debt. As a control for the incentives created by the firm's existing assets and capital structure, we include as a control a variable suggested by Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001).
Hovakimian, Opler and Titman investigate the determinants of the decision to issue debt versus equity and use as an explanatory variable the difference between the absolute value of the deviation from target leverage if the firm issues debt and the absolute value of the deviation from target leverage if the firm issues equity. They find that the larger the absolute deviation if the firm issued debt relative to the absolute deviation if the firm issues equity, the more likely that equity will be issued. We therefore expect a positive relation between this variable and the log odds ratio of issuing equity.
We consider two proxies for a firm's target leverage. One is the median leverage of the firm's industry-year with industries defined by the Fama-French 12 industry classification. The other is the predicted value of the firm's leverage ratio obtained from a regression of book leverage in year t+1 on firm size, profitability, tangibility, market-to-book ratio, depreciation, R&D expenses, a dummy equal to one when the firm reports R&D expenses, industry median book leverage, and expected inflation in year t. The regression is estimated for all industrial
Compustat firms during the 1995-2014 period. 6 None of our qualitative results or conclusions depends on which of the two proxies is used in our analyses.
Both proxies contain measurement error. For example, firms that have, say, shunned debt in the past relative to the industry median and relative to what might be predicted from a regression estimate of the firm's target are likely to continue to do so (Lemmon, Roberts and Zender, 2008) . Our data set does not contain sufficient instances of different investments by the same firm to allow us to include firm fixed effects and therefore, we also include book leverage at the end of the financial year preceding the issue as a further control.
Controls related to pecking order theory
The Myers (1984) pecking order model posits that the transaction costs associated with new issues and the costs that arise because of management's superior information about the firm's prospects are so large that the decision to finance externally largely reflects a firm's net cash flows. When a firm does raise external finance, firms will prefer to issue debt since the value of debt will be less information sensitive. Firms will though issue equity when financial distress costs loom large or a debt issue would constrain the firm's future actions too tightly.
Pecking order theory predicts that the larger the investment relative to the market value of the firm's equity, the more likely that investment will be financed with equity (de Jong, Verbeek and Verwijmeren, 2010).
Controls related to market timing
The market timing view of the debt-equity issuance decision is that if a manager believes her firm is overvalued, then she will prefer to issue equity rather than debt (Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Warusawitharana and Whited, 2016) . 7 In fact, a new investment may be simply a convenient opportunity to issue what the manager sees as overpriced shares. We include two proxies for the degree of management-perceived overvaluation of the firm's shares: the marketto-book ratio of the firm, MB, and the cumulative stock return prior to the new issue, Stock Performance.
Additional controls
Consider an investment undertaken by a firm for which future investment opportunities are important. Regardless of the characteristics of the new investment, this firm will be less willing to use debt to finance the investment in order to avoid a future debt overhang and we therefore include firm-level R&D relative to sales in the year prior to the offering in our set of controls.
We predict that high R&D firms will be more likely to finance with equity. A second proxy for valuable growth options is the firm's market-to-book ratio. Thus firms with high market-tobook ratios may be more likely to issue equity both in order to avoid future debt overhang problems and, as argued in subsection 2.3.3, because management believes they can time the market and issue overpriced equity when the firm's market-to-book ratio is high.
The logistic regression including all controls is as follows: 
The predicted signs of the coefficients on the control variables are as follows. Trade-off theory predicts that 8
 is positive and 9  is negative. Market timing theory predicts positive signs for 10  and 11  . A desire to avoid debt overhang when a firm has valuable growth options also leads to the prediction that 10  will be positive, and to the prediction that 12  will be positive.
Pecking order theory predicts a positive value for 13  .
Data
We obtain security issuance data from Thomson One Banker's SDC for seasoned equity issues, convertible debt issues, and straight debt issues by U.S. firms between 1995 and 2014. Tangible non-unique assets have many alternate uses and are easy to sell. An example in our data set is the investment in trucks by Rollins Truck Leasing Corp. We create a dummy variable equal to one when an asset is both tangible and non-unique, and zero otherwise.
purpose is the acquisition of assets, other than in the ordinary course of business, the assets must be briefly described.
Prediction 2 relates to R&D-like investments. The R&D variable is equal to one when the investment is described as such in the issue prospectus, associated reports, or news releases by the use of terms like "R&D", "innovation", and "exploration", and is zero otherwise. Prediction 3 relates to investment life. We estimate the expected lifetimes of the 371 investments. Table   3 of Fraumeni (1997) reports information on the typical life spans of various asset types. For example, life spans are typically below ten years for computing equipment (7 years) and farm tractors (9 years), but above fifteen years for aircraft (20 years), steam engines (32 years), and buildings (36 years). We check these estimates against information on expected service lives found through an internet search. For example, a KPMG report gives the useful life of the aircraft of major airlines as 20 to 25 years. 11 We choose an estimated average useful life for aircraft of 22.5 years, which is close to the 20 year service life reported in Fraumeni (1997).
Our sample contains aircraft purchases by Atlas Air, Allegiant Travel Co., JetBlue Airways, 
Data Analysis
We examine the investment characteristics and financing of the 371 investments in our sample. In total, 57 investments are financed by a debt issue, 279 by an equity issue, and 35 by a convertible issue. The relatively large proportion of equity issues might be due to greater press interest in equity issues, thereby making it more likely that we can find information of the specific investment. We examine this sample selection issue in Section 5.
We first analyze the debt-equity choice for the 336 investments financed by either straight debt or common stock. Panel A of substantially more likely to be financed by a debt issue. Consistent with our discussion of Prediction 1, this difference is driven more by uniqueness than by tangibility. In fact, in the univariate analysis, the difference in tangibility between debt-financed and equity-financed investments is non-significant.
While 67% of our sample of externally-financed investments involves tangible assets and 28% involves non-unique assets, 27% of assets are both tangible and non-unique. If these two characteristics were independent, then we would expect that 67% of investments in non-unique assets would have been tangible. The two characteristics are not independent. Fully 91 of the 94 investments in non-unique assets are tangible.
Of debt-financed investments, only two percent can be classified as R&D projects, whereas nine percent of the equity-financed investments can be so classified. While 18 percent for debt- Because debt can create an overhang problem, firm value could be diminished if a multistage R&D project were financed by debt. In line with Prediction 2, R&D-like investments are significantly more likely to be financed by equity. This relation is also statistically significant at the 1% level.
Prediction 3 was only that investment life needed to be controlled for but its affect could not be signed theoretically. In this multivariate setting, we do not find a statistically significant effect of an investment's expected life on the choice between debt and equity financing, whereas we did observe the conditionally predicted positive effect on the likelihood of financing with debt in the univariate analysis in Table 1B . The difference between the multivariate and univariate results is likely due to the fact that long-lived assets are more likely to be both tangible and non-unique (the correlation coefficient of 0.24) and hence there is a univariate force toward debt financing.
Prediction 4 is that the likelihood of equity financing is increasing with uncertainty about an investment's life. We do not find a statistically significant positive effect of investment life uncertainty on the likelihood of issuing equity in Model 1. In fact, the sign of the coefficient is negative, even though our univariate analysis indicated that 26 percent of investments financed by equity have uncertain lives versus 18 percent of investments financed by debt. An explanation for our finding is likely to be the exceptionally strong correlations between this variable and variables such as R&D (correlation coefficient of 0.49) and time until positive payoffs (correlation coefficient of 0.54). These strong correlations increase the relevance of the factor analysis conducted in Section 6.
Consistent with Prediction 5, the likelihood of equity financing is positively related to the investment's predicted payoff volatility. The relation is statistically significant at the 1% level.
High volatility means a higher chance of bankruptcy if the investment is debt-financed and thus a higher chance of a stockholder-bondholder coordination problem when it comes to restructuring the firm.
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Consistent with Prediction 6, there is a positive effect of the time until positive payoffs on the probability of equity financing. The relation is, however, only marginally statistically significant. Finally, consistent with debtholders being able to monitor more easily than outside shareholders and/or being able to incorporate restrictions into the debt's covenants, the analysis indicates that an increased need for monitoring decreases the likelihood of equity financing.
The observed negative relation is statistically significant at the 1% level.
Models 2 and 3 of Table II Importantly, the effects of the investment characteristics on the debt-equity choice are robust to the inclusion of control variables. Only the time until positive payoffs variable loses the marginal statistical significance it had in Model 1 when we consider Model 2 but that marginal significance is regained in Model 3. The estimated negative effect of asset life uncertainty becomes (marginally) significant in Models 2 and 3. Importantly, with the sole exception of the predicted effect of investment life uncertainty, five of our six predications concerning the relation between investment characteristics and the debt-equity choice are borne out in the data and in four of the five cases the relation is highly significant.
The pseudo R-squareds of Models 2 and 3 are 0.58 and 0.59, respectively. If we drop the investment characteristics from the regression specifications, the pseudo R-squared in both models decreases to 0.37. This substantial reduction in the fit of the model is significant at the 1% and shows the importance of considering investment characteristics when examining a firm's external debt-equity choice.
To consider whether the use of book leverage at the end of the prior financial year as a linear control appropriately captures the possibility that some firms are committed to very high or very low leverage, the analysis of Table II was repeated on the subset of observations where the prior year's leverage was between 0.1 and 0.9. All conclusions remain unchanged.
We now turn to the economic significance of the results of Table II 
Heckman two-stage sample selection model
For the 2217 issues undertaken to finance capital expenditures, we were only able to find details on the investments' characteristics in 371 cases. Thus sample selection bias could be problematic for the interpretation of our results if the firm's debt-equity choice and the likelihood of either the firm or the financial press reporting details on the use of the new issue's proceeds are determined by a common set of unobservable determinants (Heckman, 1979; Dutordoir et al., 2017) . A bias will arise if the unobservable determinants are also correlated with investment characteristics. To examine the effects of a potential sample selection bias, we 19 use the two-stage Heckman regression technique, adjusted for a binary dependent variable. In the first stage, we estimate a probit model of the probability that a firm or the press reports details on an investment, and in the second stage we estimate a probit model of the debt-equity choice to finance the investment. The estimation of the first stage of the model results in an inverse Mill's ratio, which serves as control for sample selection bias in the second stage.
Our first-stage specification includes as explanatory variables the set of firm characteristics that are also used in the second stage plus two instruments for the probability of reporting.
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The instruments are the reputation of the investment bank and the industry-year norm of providing information. Neither of these variables is likely to have a strong direct link to the debt-equity choice, while both variables are likely to be related to information provision. More specifically, higher reputation underwriters are expected to be associated with better information provision and we use the list of the 15 most reputable investment banks from Fang (2005). Use of the industry-year norm of providing information as an instrument follows
Anderson, Duru and Reeb (2012) . 19 We calculate the industry-year norm of providing information as the log of one plus the percentage of equity issuers in a Fama-French 12 industry-year that report a specific principal use of the issue proceeds in SDC (i.e., a use of proceeds such as "capital expenditures", "refinancing", or "future acquisitions", rather than simply "general corporate purposes"). We expect that a high industry norm of being more specific is associated with a higher likelihood of providing details on an investment's characteristics.
The results of the Heckman procedure are contained in Table III . It can be seen from the first stage probit that high reputation underwriters and a high industry norm are both associated with a higher likelihood of providing details on an investment's characteristics. Firms relying on R&D are less likely to disclose details, whereas high stock returns increase the probability of providing information. Importantly, the conclusions on the effects of the investment characteristics in the second-stage regression are similar to those drawn from Table II . The strongest effects are that R&D-like investments and investments with volatile payoffs are more likely to be financed by equity, whereas tangible and non-unique assets are more likely to be financed by debt. These findings suggest that our results are robust to the sample selection bias 18 The results reported in Table III use industry median leverage deviation as one of the variables. The results are effectively unchanged if instead the leverage deviation is measured relative to the firm's target leverage ratio.
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resulting from heterogeneous information provision across firms and are not driven by an overrepresentation of equity issues in our sample.
Factor analysis
Investment characteristics are difficult to define precisely. For example, the collateral value of an investment is linked to its tangibility and non-uniqueness since both of these will determine the ease with which it can be traded without significant price impact. Hence we use the product of the tangibility and non-uniqueness dummies as our proxy for investments with high collateral values. Further, the ability to resell an asset will also depend on the uncertainty surrounding its life and the volatility of its payoffs; i.e., on other elements of our set of investment characteristics. Both the high correlations between the investment characteristics (Panel C of Table I ) and the tractability of considering a smaller number of variables make a factor analysis potentially interesting. Table IV reports the results of a factor analysis of the seven investment characteristics using the principal factor method. The analysis identifies three principal dimensions along which investments differ.
The eigenvalue of a factor is a measure of the variation in all the characteristics accounted for by that factor. By construction, the first factor has the highest eigenvalue and contributes most to the explanation of variation in the characteristics. In our analysis, the first factor explains 71% of the total variation explained by the first three factors. The first factor loads positively on R&D, investment life uncertainty, payoff volatility, the need for monitoring, and the time until positive payoffs. The first factor also loads negatively on the tangible, non-unique investment characteristic. As such, the first factor seems to represent R&D-like investments.
The second factor explains 17% of the variation associated with the first three factors loads positively on the tangible, non-unique characteristic and on the investment's life. The third factor, which explains only 12% of that variation, is also related to the tangible, non-unique nature of an investment, but differs from the second factor in that it loads negatively on payoff volatility rather than positively on investment life.
In Table V , we use the three identified factors as the explanatory variables for the debtequity choice and employ the same set of control variables as in Table II . Whether or not the controls are included in the analysis, the results are consistent with (i) R&D-like investments (factor 1) being more likely to be equity-financed and (ii) long-term tangible, non-unique 21 investments (factor 2) and low-volatility tangible, non-unique investments (factor 3) being more likely to be debt-financed.
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Convertible issues
In this section we investigate the characteristics of the 35 investments in our sample that are financed by a convertible issue. There is no debt overhang when a sequential program is equity-financed. But financing with equity is not necessarily optimal since equity can fail to discipline managerial opportunism. And although there is no debt overhang if an investment program is financed by a series of short-term debt issues, each rollover involves additional issuance costs. Mayers (1998) argues that financing via a convertible reduces these issuance costs because callability allows the firm to force conversion and proceed with its desired financing plan only at the time a prior stage is successful. Convertibles are especially useful when the life of the first stage is uncertain. Since the call can be synchronized with the resolution of the uncertainty surrounding the first stage, Mayers concludes that issuing a convertible can be the optimal way to finance sequential investment programs.
Panel A of Table VI reports the mean value of the characteristics of the investments financed by issuing a convertible as well as information on the distribution of the estimated lives of these investments and on the issuing firm control variables. Panel B of Table VI reports the results of a multinomial logit analysis of the financing choice taking the issuance of a convertible as the reference category. Column (1) of Panel B reports the likelihood that an investment is financed by straight debt rather than issuing a convertible and Column (2) reports the likelihood of financing an investment with equity rather than with a convertible.
The relative likelihood of financing a new investment by issuing straight debt rather than a convertible is higher when the investment's characteristics are such that it can be classified as tangible and non-unique with a high need for monitoring. The likelihood of a convertible issue rather than a straight debt issue is increased when investments have volatile payoffs. The important control variable determining the likelihood of issuing a convertible rather than straight debt is the firm's existing expenditures on R&D relative to sales. A firm that undertakes a high level of R&D activity will want to preserve its ability to finance future growth 22 opportunities and avoid a debt overhang. This increases the relative likelihood of financing by issuing a convertible rather than straight debt.
The relative likelihood of financing a new investment by issuing a convertible rather than equity increases when the investment's characteristics are such that its life is uncertain and its payoffs are more volatile. These findings are in line with the predictions of Mayers (1998). The control variables that are significant determinants of the likelihood of issuing a convertible rather than equity relate in part to an avoidance of the debt inherent in a convertible issue.
Relative to financing with a convertible, equity financing becomes more likely when the issuing firm's existing leverage is consistent with a preference for low leverage and when financing with debt rather than equity would lead to a greater deviation from the industry median leverage. 21 Other important controls are the issuing firm's market-to-book ratio and its expenditures on R&D measured relative to its sales. An increase in either variable increases the likelihood of observing a convertible issue rather than an equity issue. This is consistent with the advantage convertible financing has for firms with high growth opportunities. Finally, and consistent with our earlier results on the choice between debt and equity financing, the larger the size of the investment relative to the market value of the issuer's equity, the more likely that any debt issue, convertible or otherwise, will push against the firm's debt capacity.
The likelihood of an equity issue rather than a convertible bond issue is then higher.
In summary, our results on convertible financing and investment characteristics are in line with Mayers (1998): Highly volatile investment payoffs increase the likelihood of financing via a convertible rather than either debt or equity, and a highly uncertain investment life increases the likelihood of financing via a convertible rather than by issuing equity.
Conclusion
We examine the link between the characteristics of new investments and the choice between debt and equity when the investment is externally financed. We do so by investigating a hand-collected data set. Our analysis controls for potential selection biases in the type of new issues that are associated with sufficient information to determine the new investment's characteristics. Our analysis also controls for the firm's existing assets and capital structure and for both pecking order and market timing determinants of the financing choice. By investigating investment characteristics we are able to conclude that each of the trade-off, market timing, and pecking order theories helps explain the choice between debt and equity financing.
Investment characteristics are shown to reflect three factors. The first factor loads positively on R&D, investment life uncertainty, payoff volatility, the need for monitoring, and the time until positive payoffs, while loading negatively on the tangible, non-unique nature of an investment. As such, the first factor seems to represent R&D-like investments. Consistent with trade-off theory, investments associated with this factor are relatively more likely to be equity-financed. The second factor loads positively on tangible, non-unique, long-term investments and, also consistent with trade-off theory, these investments are relatively more likely to be debt-financed. The third factor seems to represent tangible, non-unique investments with low payoff volatility and such investments are also relatively more likely to be debtfinanced. We separately examine the relation between investment characteristics and financing via a convertible bond issue. Convertibles are more likely to be issued when the investment's characteristics are consistent with it being part of a sequential investment program.
Our findings will be of interest to those investigating project financing. Project finance is used to finance economically separable, long-term infrastructure and industrial projects, with the funds raised by a legally independent project company on a limited or non-recourse basis (Esty, 2004; Leland, 2007; Finnerty, 2013) . A different avenue for future research is the extent to which the characteristics of investments undertaken with the proceeds of new issues are important in understanding the differential announcement effects of debt versus equity issues. (Fang, 2005) . Industry-year norm is the log of one plus the % of equity issuers in a Fama-French 12 industryyear reporting a specific principal use of proceeds in SDC. See Table I Table IV . The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one for common equity issues and zero for straight debt issues. See Table I for a description of the explanatory variables. Industry dummies are based on the Fama-French 12 industry classification. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the issuer level are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Debt-equity choice (1) 
